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- INCE 1980 all depository institutions have been
required tohold reserve balances in the form ofTrea-
suiy coins and Federal Reserve notes either in their
own vaults or on deposit at their regional Federal
Reserve Banks. These reservebalances payno interest,
so the foregone interest earnings on the investments
the firm could otherwise have made can be viewed as
a tax.’
Thistax lowers the firm’s expected stream of future
income net of taxes which, other things the same,
reduces the capital value of the firm. The tax varies
with the general level of interest rates as well as the
spread between bank lending and borrowing rates.
Prior to 1980, the tax had differential effects across
banks depending on the tax rate required reserve
ratio) faced by these various firms. This was particu-
larly true with respect to member- vs. nonmember
banks of the Federal Reserve System.4 These differen-
tial tax effects are important. Equity considerations
aside, theyartificially r’aise the operating costs of some
finns relativeto others engagedin essentially the same
businessactivity. This distorts rates ofproduction and
the allocation of resources among the differentially
taxed firms and lowers the value of output for’ given
costs.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 imposed uniform
reserve requirements on all depository institutions by
raising reserve requirements for nonmember banks,
while lowering them for member banks. The purpose
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and Knight(1974).
‘See Goldberg and Rose (1976) and Prestopino (1976).
ofthis article is to analyze theeffect thislegislation has
had in eliminating the differential tax effect of interest
rate changes on member’ vs. nonmember banks. In
particular, the paper examines whether the act was
effectivein revisingthe response ofbankcapital values
stock prices) to interest rate changes. Since any revi-
sion in differences in tax rates between groups gener-
ally benefits one group over another, the paper pro-
vides some rough estimates of this as well.
HE:SFHVE J1J)JRJ~ MENFS: :PRE— I9~O
Prior to the Monetary Control Act, reserve require-
ments for nonmember banks were set by the var’ious
state banking authorities. These differed across states
with respect to the reserve ratio, theform in which the
reserves were required to be held, the method and
frequency of policing and the penalty imposed for
deficiency.3 While differences existed, the reserve re-
quirements ofstatebankingauthorities generallywere
more lenient than those ofthe Federal Reserve System.
This appears to havebeen sowith respect to the for’m
of the reserves, policing and penalties for-deficiency.~
Specifically, 30 of the 50 state banking authorities
allowed banks to hold at least a portion of their re-
serves in interest-earning assets, 36 states did not
require periodic reporting of reserve and deposit bal-
ances and 22 had no monetary penalty for deficient
banks.~ In contrast, Fed members had to hold reserves
either in theirvaults oron deposit at aFederal Reserve
Bank. These reserve balances earned no interest.
Member banks reported their deposit and reserve
balances to the Fed on aweekly basis, and a monetary
penalty was enforced for deficient banks.
The left side of table 1 gives the reserve require-
~See Gilbert and Lovati (1978), Prestopino (1976) and Knight(1974).
‘See Gilbert and Lovati (1978), p. 32, and Knight (1974), p. 12—13,
for listings of the various state requirements.
‘Seven states imposed reserve requirements that were roughly
identical to those of Fed members. These states were Arkansas,
California, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Utah,
Nonmember banks in these states are excluded from the data
sample in the tests conducted below.
12Table 1: DepositOry Institutions’ Reserve Requirements (percent of deposits)
Depository
Member bankrequirements institution requirements
beforeimplementation . after implementationofthe Type ofdeposit and Type of deposrt. of the Monetary Control Act . Monetary Control Act6
deposit interval ... ~ and deposit interval
(millionsofdollars) Percent Effective date (miltions of dollars) Percent Effective date
Net demand 2 Nettransaction accounts’
$ 0-- 2 7 % 1230.76 505298 1185
2— 10 9’, 123076 OverS298 12 1185
10—lOU l1~s 123076
100-400 17’- 123076
Over 400 16’ 12 30:76 NonpersOnal time deposits6
Time and savings”-’ By original marur~ty
Savings 3 ~ 31667 Less than 4years 3°,, 10683
Time’ 4 years or more 10 6 83
0—S. by maturity EurocutfencY liabilities
30-179days 3 31667 All types 3% 111380
lBOdaystO4VearS 22 1,876
4 yearsor more 1 103075
Over 5. by maturity
30—l79dayS 6 121274
180 days to 4years 2’’ 1 876 SOURCE Federal Reserve Bulletin. November 1980. p AS
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(b) ‘The Federal Reserve Act as amended through 1978 specified differentranges ot reourenlents’O’ reserve citl banks and tor whet balks fleserve cities
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not in reserve cities.
Icr Ettectrve August 24. ‘978, the Regulation M reserve req.iirements on net baiarces oue from dnrriestic ba’rics to thor foreign branches and on deposits
that toreign branches lend to u S residents were reducea to zero trom 4 porcenr and 1 percent.respect’veiY The Rc.gu’atici 0 reserve requ’rerIlPnt on
borrowings from unrelated banks abroad was a;se reduced to zero irorn 4 p’erJent
(dl Effectivewith the reserve computation period beginr.ing November 16.1978 .lomestic deposits& Edge corporatiOrs were subJect to the same reserve
requirements as deposits ot member banks
aNegotiabie orderot w,tndra’*ai INOWi accounts and time deposits suchas Christnas and vacation cluh arcnunttswere sub,octto the same reouiremelts as
sarlngs deposits.
‘The average reserve recuirenlent onsav-ngs and other t.me deposi’s atmat ‘.me bad to Sc at east 3 porcenr the m’r~i’nLrTr 50cc’
4
cc by iaw
‘Effective November2. 1978. a supplementary reserve reouiremert ot 2 percent was imposed or. anontmo deposIS ct SiO0.000 0’ more cb:’gat .ons ot
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the reserve maintenance period beginn.ng October 2h. 1979. a ~argilai reserve reou,rement Qi 8 percent was ~~ceato managed liabilitiec ii excess of a
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reouc.ed to zero beg nn.ng Juiy 28. 1980 Managed i,abiiut es areoet.ned as largi t.me accosts curodoi
1
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reserve in the statement week of May 14-21. ~98O in adoition beginning March ~9 1980 lie h~5ewd5 ‘educec to the extent mat ‘oreign loans and ba’ances
decl,ned
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‘in general. nonpetsonalt me depos’ts are time deposits. inciuding savIngs deposits ian are not transaction accounts and ‘n who
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Table 2
Member Bank Foregone Interest on
Reserve Balances (millions of dollars)
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‘Foregone interest i requrmed reserves
ments that applied to Federal Reserve member banks
before November 1980. These reserve ratios were at
least as high as those imposed by the various state
banking authorities for nonmember banks and. in
most cases, they were higher.:
Other things the same, the more stringent reserve
requirements for Fed members raised the cost of
maintaining a given level of deposits relative to the
cost experienced by nonmembers. Table 2 uses the
data in table 1 to calculate the taxfor member banks at
various levels of net demand deposits-’ For example, a
member bank with $100 million in net demand de-
posits was required to hold $11.48 million in reserves.
This resulted in foregone earnings of $918,000 peryear
if the market rate were 8 percent.” ‘the decline in the
expected stream of earnings was the reserve tax in
this case, $918,000 pci-year).Since the capitalvalue of a
firm is the present value of its expected earnings
stream, the taxreduced the capital value ofthebank as
well.
‘The MonetaryControl Act was passed in March 1980, but the new
reserve requirements did not become effective immediately. The
right side ofthe table indicatesthe reserve requirementsthat would
have been imposed as of November 13, 1 g80, if therehad been no
phase-in period. In fact, these new requirements were phased in
over a period of years (see table 1, note 6). For the moment, the
discussion is focusedon pre-November1980 reserve requirements.
‘See Gilbert and Lovati (1978) for a listing of the reserve ratios
imposed by the various state authorities.
‘Thecalculationis intended forillustrative purposesonly and ignores
the foregone interest on reservesheld againsttime deposits.
‘This represents an upper bound to the tax since the bank would
maintain some reserveseven if therewere no legal requirement to
do so.
Not only does the reserve tax reduce the expected
earnings str’eams and capital values of member banks
those with higher reserve requirements) relative to
nonmember banks, but the earnings streams and cap-
ital values of member banks change relative to non-
member banks with changes in either the general level
of interest rates or the spread between bank borrow-
ing and lending rates.
Table 3 illustrates the effect ofa change in the level
of interest Fates with the spread held constant. In
panel A, the late at which banks can lend is assumed
to be 10 percent. while the rate paid on deposits land
other sources of funds) is 5 percent. The reserve re-
quirement for member banks is assumed to be 10
percent. For illustrative purposes, the non-interest-
earnings reserves of nonmembers are assumed to be
zero. The table calculates the amount available for
lending, the annual net revenue and the capital value
of the net revenue stream for each $100 ofdeposits for
both amember and a nonmember bank.
The reserve requirement lowers the amount that
can be loaned, the stream of net revenue and capital
value ofthe member relative to the nonmember bank.
The capital value of the member’s revenue stream is
$40, while the nonmember’s is $50. The member’s
capital value relative to the nonmember’s is 80 per’-
cent. Notice that the absolute difference between the
two capital values is equal to the required reserves of
members ($50 — $40 = $10).
In panel B, both lending and borrowing rates are
assumed to increase to 20 percent and 15 percent,
respectively, while other things remain the same.” The
net revenue stream of the nonmember does not
change while the member’s stream falls.The increase
in interest rates causes the capital ~àlue of both banks
to decline. More importantly, however, the capital
value of the membei’bank drops from 80 percent to 60
percent in terms of the capital value of the nonmem-
ber bank.
Notice that, in this particular case, the absolute
51n the example, the absolute spread is unchanged but the relative
spread (it/iL) changes. If the ratioof the borrowing to the tending rate
remained constant as the general level of interest rates changed,
relative capital values would not change. The example is intended
for illustrative purposes. A more precise statement of the effect of
interest rate changes is given in the appendix,Table 3
A Change in the General Level of Interest Rates and Relative
Capital Values’
Relative
Members Nonmembers Capital Value
Panel A: Lending rate = 10%
Borrowing rate = 5%
Deposit $100 5100
Required reserves 10 -—
Available for lending $9 0 $100
Annual revenue C 10.’ Loan) $9 $ 10
Cost (.05 Deposit) 5 5
Net revenue $ 4 $ 5
Capital vaiue (Net revenue .lOj $ 40 $ 50 .80




Available for lending $ 90 $100
Annual revenue(20 . Loan) $ 18 $ 20
Cost (.15 Deposit) 15 15
Net revenue $ 3 $ 5
Capita: value tNet revenue 201 $ 15 $ 25 .60
Conditions of the example are thatdeposits of both banks are $100 the
required reserve ratio for members is 10 percentand zero for nonmembers.
drttrn—enrehet~~een the rapital ‘alLies of the Inn banks tinIli lianks rke ~‘itii 11w cipilal value 01 he inienriher
dots not riuin~i ‘I his is ht’rdLise the banks in thb r.~iingr-elatj~eto that ot the nonunemher
exaiiipte ha~ethe sainle Inc1 ot deposnts rod, thus. the .- -
-- In Ibis e\anipie. the interest i-atespread increases is
dttlerenitial tlteet caused by rnrernher- hank n-eserve i-c— --
-- - the hank lending iate rises. n title the born-on ing rate
tItnuinnents renWins conslant see liii’ appenclr\ ton- a -- - - -
- remains the sante \ qu.clitatr~ehsimilar result would mole br-oral presentatri nil ---. -- occur 1 the hon r-ri~~ rug i-ate derlrned. while the lending
‘ate rnianned time same
t’~ liilr nl,,jr,ges iii lhe ‘prt’ad ri-c poterttiaIl~ii~poi--
l’at,Ie I is sirnnlar to tzrhle 3 ewept th,rl it illustrates taut. tno problems rinse ~ hen lestioi.~br’ this cited.
the cued on relathe eat-flings streanr~ .rrrd capital I inst. pm ion to briM I the interest rate banks etlLild pa~
urlues of a change in the spread hetneen the interest on depn.~itsn as suhjeel to a ceiling During nnuch cii
ale banks char-ge on loans and the n-ate paid on the earhen- p01 rhin~ cii he sample period used here, the
deposits Ihe top bakes of the ni, tables are identical reilin,g was eltc-cti~ e. ‘s a n’esull changes ir~ the spread
Itt panel R ol table -4 tinnewn’. the lending -ate is net’’ tinuhk correlated v~ jIlt rhange5 in the general
assumed to itlerease ~~hile lhe honon jnr~ rate neiniatos Ie~elof interesl r~rIe~ simon. liii spread hutneen
unichangtd. tin I:arrting .—~tm-r’.rmsarid capital ~,rIrics ot lending and iron mirt~ ing n\tes 5 tile conipensatinnTable 4
Changes in the Interest Rate Spread and Relative Capital Values
Relative
Members Nonmembers Capital Value




Available for lending $
Annual revenue~.l0x Loan) $ 9$ 10
Cost(.05 Deposit) 55
Net revenue $4 $5
Capital value (Net revenue~.10~ $40 $50 .80
Panel B: Lending rate = 20%
Borrowing rate = 5%
Deposit $100 $100
Required reserves 10 —
Availablefor lending $90 $100
Annual revenue (.20 / Loan) $ 18 $ 20
Cost (.05 .‘ Deposit) 55
Net revenue $13 $15
Capital value (Net revenue .20) $65 $75 87
The conditionsof the example are that deposits For both banks are $100, the required reserve ratio for
member banks is 10 percent. both banks pay 5 percent on deposits and both extend loans at the same
interest rate. In panel A. the loan rate is 10 percent while, in panel B. the loan rate is 20 percent. The
borrowrng ratedoes not change. Thefirm’s cost of capital is assumed to equal thelending rate.
i~rrtkslain liii ent~plovingtheir specialized i,esorn,ces
to intermediate linanrial tiansitutions. When horron’—
ingand lending n’attsare tree to mo\e. as ~%aslitre after’
1981. competition aiming intermediaries assures that ftc’ right side ot tahle I shows the reserve requirE’—
the spread is lust sutlirient tot overcosts t.’nless there nients of depository institutions alter the irtiplementa
is a t’liauge in the tt’chnmio~vof the intermediation tion cit the Monetary ( otitrol ,~ct. ‘l’hese reserve re—
pr’ocesn. there is little reason to expect he spread In quirements apply to depositor~ inst ittitionts
~‘an’ sigrimtieantlv For these itasotls. the spteatl is regardless ot I ed membership. I Itey substantially re—
excluded in the tollon lug empirical anal~ sis and at— dure the requi’ed reserve balances of member hatiks
tention is focused on ~ariation in the In el of interest
rates.
this variabie did not differ significantly from zero. The proxies for the
lending rate used to calculate the spread were the one-month
commercial paper rate, the 4-6 month commercial paper rate and
In regressions not reported here, the product of a dummy variabie tne 90-day bankers acceptance rate. The borrowing rate proxy was
and various proxies ‘or ihe spread were tested. The dummy variable the Federai Reserve discount rate.
was used to control for the perrod of deposit rate ceiiings that
prevailed prior to 1981 rrie dummy variable assumed a value of ‘ See table 1. note 6. for a discussion of the period over which the new
one for the period sirce relaxation of the interest rate ceilings on reaurrements were phaseo in In the text, the phase-in period is
deposits (I 1981 —IV 1 983}. arid zero otherwise rho coethcient of ignored unless olherwmse mentionedat each level of net demand deposits, while generally
increasing them for nonmember banks.
Table I also presents the pre- and post-reserve
requirements on time and savings deposits. Before the
Monetary Control Act, required reserve holdings
against personal and nonpersonal time deposits
ranged from I to 6 percent (with a minimum average
requirement of 3 percent), while those on savings
deposits were a percent. The act reduced these re-
quirements to zero for personal time and savings
accounts.3 Since these deposits represent a substan-
tial portion of total time and savings deposits, this
change results in a significant reduction in member
bank required reserves.1 Furthermore, the reserve re-
quirement on managed liabilities andthe supplemen-
tary reserve requirement on time deposits of $100,000
or more were reduced to zero in July 1980.
While the change in the level of required reserves
mandated by the act is clearly important for some
issues, what ismost important forthe purpose ofthis
paper is that this legislation imposes uniform reserve
requirements across member and nonmember banks.
(See, the insert on page 18 for a discussion of some
other provisions of the act.)
The phase-in period for the new reserve require-
ments, which extended through 1984 for member
banks, will not be complete for nonmembers until
September 1987. This will mitigate the quantitative
effect ofthe change on the following estimates but the
expected qualitative effect should show through.”
In an effort to evaluate the implications ofthe above
argument, quarterly data on the share prices and
demand deposit liabilities of 40 publicly traded bank
holding companies were examined. The holding com-
panies were divided into twocategories depending on
“See table 1, note 8, for a definition ofpersonal vs. nonpersonal time
and savings deposits.
4For example, for banks in the Eighth Federal Reserve District, the
personal portion of savings deposits was more than five times
greater than the nonpersonal portion, while the personal portion of
time deposits was more than four times the nonpersonal portion.
‘“See Pearce and Roley (1983) and (1985).
whether the subsidiary banks making up an individual
holding company were members or nonmembers of
the Federal Reserve System.’”The stock prices of each
holding company were adjusted for stock splits and
stock dividends, and simple quarterly averages of
stockprices and demand deposit liabilities were com-
puted for each of the two categories ofholding com-
panies. The sample period runs from l/1974—lV/19&3.
The previous arguments imply that the capital val-
ues of member relative to nonmember banks will be
related in a specific way to certain other variables.
Consequently, the variable to be explained (depen-
dent variable) in thefollowing regression is the ratio of
the average stock prices of member to nonmember
banks. For purposes of the empirical estimate, the
dependent variable is expressed in logform.
The following empirical analysis is primarily con-
cerned with the relationship between the dependent
variable and the level of interest rates. Since an in-
crease in the level ofinterest rates is thought to reduce
member bank capital values relative to those of non-
member banks, the sign ofthe estimated coefficient on
the level of interest rates is expected to be negative.
Further, the above arguments indicate that the rela-
tionship between these variables will change in a
particular wayfollowing implementation ofthe Mone-
taiy Control Act.”’Consequently, an intet-action term is
included in the regression as an independent van-
able.’”
The interaction term isincluded to test for the effect
that the Monetary Control Acthas had in eliminating
thedifferential response of the capital values of mem-
bers vs. nonmembers to interest rate changes. The
interaction term is the product of a coefficient (to be
estimated(, a dummy variable and the level of the
interest rate. The dummy variable assumes a value of
one for the period subsequent to implementation of
the Monetary Control Act, while its value is zero dur-
ing the earlier period. Since the hypothesis suggests
that the uniform reserve requirements embodied in
the legislation will eliminate the adverse conse-
‘“The data set includes only state-chartered banks. Nationally char-
tered banks are required to be members of the Fed, but are ex-
cludedfrom this sample mainly because they are much larger on
average than state-chartered banks and are subject to different
regulatory agencies.
“‘See the appendix for a summary of the theory that underlies the
estimating equation.
‘“The proxy employed for the general level of interest rates is the
corporate Aaa bond rate. A long-term interest rate was selected
since it is presumed to represent some average of current and
expectedfuture shorter-term interest rates.FRAL RARER RE RANK OF St tRiES:
Chort I

















Some Other Provisions of the Act
I It.’ \torietarv C otiti 01 Aet c-cjnitairis ritany other exc-lusi~e privilege ol niemtier banks.
piovisiciris Ihat have liii )(ul ant implications for i~ t’tfi’c ol these twn) changes is Fri ratse the
financial firmsand markets that ale distinct horn its (-apital talues of nonmember banks relati~e to
un pact on i ecIniIri‘d reserves. Most of these provi— menuher banks and to ojt-,et theellect oft he itser~e
siont~are iiIII 0‘qn‘C It’cl to affect menthor liariks anx requitenient changes. It is tint Iikelv, however, that
dihmn’ii nthi Ittan non ETh‘Iiit)er batik - I here au’ two these two provisions cii ttieact cornph’tcl~ ofise I the
(‘~t(‘ept ion is tic AV(’~en c’flecI nil Iho reseive i-eqttii-eLnent changes on it’lzt-
BeIinc’ Ihe \tonr’tan’ Cfln Iml Act, the Federal tlye capital altin’’~.Prior to 1980, Federal Rn’sen’e
Best ‘i-ye Sysl (‘nit )rovidoc I cer ain senice’, to men i— niernt ersh np ~ as cicclin irig both atisolutely and
ber 5 Iltat wei e Free cit clirec t change In addition, it’] atlye to all conrtmerci,il banks isee liar Il Ih e
nnembeus were al town ci to bctiron In-nm ttie Svsl em iitost iit’qt it’!)I 1%’ nien) I jotted ivasrin Ion Iea~’ing was
at the Federal Reserve disco tinit rate Neither ot the Systems higher reset-vt’ requirt’nict its. C:learlv
hesn’ sen~ icc’s ~ ore avaitable It) noniii em her bai iks for tine batiks that decidn’d IC) leave and those new
It u- Fedoral liesen e Svst em is n iw reqiiired by the Itanks ihat (lid not In liii the System s rn~’,eive rt”—
~lonetarv Coot r o I -~ct to cliargo for the banking np tirements were ton) Iugh a ii’ice to la yfor free
servit t-s it I ti-ox-ides antI to make Ihc se sen-vices sen-ic es a jul access to the di scottnt window
available to any Itank IIrat wants to use them In
addit 1W t. horims-ini~ft on n the led i. no 1wiger Ihe - See Brewer (1980)
1951 53 55 51 59 61 63 65 61 69 71 73 15 77 79 81 1983Table 5
The Monetary Control Act and the Stock
Prices of Member Vs. Nonmember Banks
Estimate
Ln(P~. P,,) - 065 - .089 DM D,,. 055 I . 020 DUM’i




where. P,~ P., the averaqe stocx once of member banks
relative to the average for rionmember banks
D,, 0., - the average eve, ot member bank demand
deposit liabilities relative to the average for
nonmember banks
-- a proxy for the general level of interest rates
The proxy is the level of the corporate Aaa
bond nate
DUM ‘ a dummy variable for the period since
implementation ot the Monetary Control Act
DUM 1 for the penod 11981 -IV 1983 and
zero otherwise
Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level
i-values in parentheses Adjusted for first-order autocorretation.
The regression was checked for second-order autocorrelation
with the followinq result: Rho2 - 07 t-value .46
-The estimate deteriorates if D 1 for the period lI1980—hV 1983
and zero otherwise. This definition includes the period between
March 1980 when the legislation was passed and November
1980 when it was implemented.
quences experienced hy member banks when the
general level ofinterest rates rise, the expected sign of
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive.Were
it not for the phase-in period, the absolute values of
this coefficient and the coefficient on the level of
interest rates would be the same, indicating that the
elimination of differential reserve requirements com-
pletely eliminates the differential response of member
bank capital values to the level ofthe interest rate.
Finally, the ratio of member to nonmember demand
deposit liabilities is included as a scale variable. The
sign of the coefficient on this variable is ambiguous.
However, variation in the size of members relative to
nonmembers can affect the dependent variable (see
appendix) and, if the regression does not control for
this variation, it can contaminate estimates of the
other coefficients.
Table 5 presents the results of the regression. The
variable included to control fordifferences in the scale
ofthe two types ofbanks is significant and positive.
For the purposes of this paper, the coefficients on
theinterest rate and the interaction term are the most
interesting. Asexpected, thecoefficient on the interest
rate is negative and significant, indicating that ahigher
interest rate is associated with a lower value of the
dependent variable.
The sensitivity of the dependent variable to interest
rate changes is measured by its interest rate elasticity.
Anestimate ofthe average elasticity during the period
prior to the Monetary Control Act is given by the
product of the coefficient of the interest rate and its
averagelevel 8.7percent) -In this case, theinterest rate
elasticity is estimated to be — .48( = .055 )< 8.7). This
indicates that a 1 percent increase in the interest rate
reduces the share prices of member relative to non-
member banks by about 0.5 percent.
Implementation of the Monetary Control Act ap-
pears to have mitigated this differential effect.The sign
of the interaction term is positive and significant. The
coefficient, however, is less in absolute value than the
coefficient of the interest rate. This is not surprising
given that the new reserve requirements were phased
in and that the phase-in will continue through 1987.
As of this point in the phase-in (IV/1983), and with
the average level of interest rates held constant at 8.7
percent, the interest rate elasticity is estimated to be
— .30[ = (020 — .055) X 871. This represents a decline
of about 40 percent in the interest rate sensitivity of
the dependent variable. It is important to recognize
that this sensitivity is reduced not only because the
sensitivity ofmember bank share prices to interest rate
changes declines but also because the legislation, by
imposing uniform reserve requirements on all banks,
increases the interest rate sensitivity of nonmember
bank share prices.
The average level of interest rates rose to about 13
percent subsequent to the Monetary Control Act. Had
the act not been in place, the share prices of member
relative to nonmember banks would have declined by
about 24 percent [= 100 X —48(13.0 — 8.7)/8.71. The
legislation, however, tempered this to adecline ofonly
15 percent [= 100 X — .30(13.0 — 87)18.71.
The reserve requirements imposed on the deposit
liabilities of financial institutions have the properties
of a tax. This tax varies with the interest rate and has
differential effects across banks depending on their
reserve requirements. Animportant change in this taxwas made in the Monetary Control Act of1980.The act
imposed uniform reserve requirements across all
financial firms by raising reserve requirements for
firms that were not members of the Federal Reserve
System, while lowering them for member banks. This
paper analyzes the legislation’s effect on the relation-
ship between the interest rate and the stock prices of
member and nonmember commercial banks. As ex-
pected, the legislation has significantly reduced the
differential effect of interest rate changes on the rela-
tive stock price of these banks. In the process, it has
raised the after-tax earnings streams and stock prices
ofmember banks, other things the same, while lower-
ing both for nonmember banks.
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